I would like to explain to you again the last of the four proposals that I presented on the Second of this month,a concerning the establishment of a Constitutional Jury.b I have discussed various aspects of my proposal with the Committee of Eleven, to whom you referred me and who have been occupied with my work for several days now. The Committee welcomes the establishment of such an institution. I therefore thought it useful to present my proposal to the Committee in fuller detail. Not all my ideas were accepted: the Committee limited itself to the sections I have already announced and for which the need is most evident. Nevertheless, the Committee wishes that I present to you my original proposal in its entirety. I will try to do this as concisely as possible.
I admit that I am reluctant to detach the part of my plan that the Committee wants to accept from its proper context. It is my view that no aspect of the a Sieyès's proposal was submitted on the Second Thermidor social mechanism (la mécanique sociale)c should be left to chance, and that the proper place of each part is determined by its position in the overall institutional structure, which cannot be changed at will. But even if the Constitutional Jury, as an isolated element, will no longer enjoy quite the same harmonious fit with respect to the other institutions and may consequently lose some of its effectiveness, it can still play a useful part in your plans. This is what my most recent work has been aimed at. The current political situation has encouraged me to leave unaltered the full powers I originally assigned to the Jury, especially the second one, the right to improve the constitution piece by piece. In these times especially, do we not have an acute need for such a means of improvement, which functions almost imperceptibly but nevertheless effectively, in accordance with our increasing enlightenment and growing experience? (I am not referring to revolutionary upheavals, whose prevention is not the task of our Jury.) It is, in other words, a procedure of improvement that accords with fundamental political principles but suits the needs and character of the French people as well.
A preliminary question concerns the need for such a Constitutional Jury. Would a provident legislator abandon a constitution to uphold itself from the moment when it is born? If it is anything at all, a constitution is a body of binding laws-and if it is that, one can reasonably ask who will guard it and who will be the judge of this legal code. We will have to give an answer to this question. To remain silent on such a fundamental matter would be both inconceivable and ridiculous in the social sphere, so why would you tolerate it in the political sphere? Whatever their character, laws admit of being broken, and therefore must be enforceable.
I therefore allow myself to ask you, Whom have you chosen to receive complaints concerning violations of the constitution? Whom have you charged with enforcing the law? Are the civil courts to exercise this eminent role? Remember the prudent directive that prohibits judges from removing administrators for bad performance. How much more should we withhold from judges the power to remove the highest political officeholders (les premiers corps politiques)?
To treat the constitution as another part of the civil code would be fundamentally misguided. You are not given to such errors of judgment, and
